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Résumé / Abstract
Cet article présente des résultats empiriques selon lesquels
l’assurance contre les accidents du travail (AA) et l’assurance-chômage (AC)
n’influencent pas uniquement l’incidence des accidents du travail, mais aussi la
composition des accidents rapportés. Le cadre théorique prédit que, selon les
hypothèses plausibles, une hausse du taux de remplacement du salaire par l’AA
(ou baisse du taux de remplacement du salaire par l’AC) conduit à une
augmentation plus élevée de la probabilité de déclarer une lésion professionnelle
difficile à diagnostiquer qu’une lésion facile à diagnostiquer. Aux fins
d’estimations, on utilise des données longitudinales mensuelles sur plus de 9800
travailleurs œuvrant dans le secteur de la construction au Québec entre 1977 et
1986. Ces données proviennent d’un jumelage de données administratives de la
Commission de la construction du Québec et de la Commission de la santé et de
la sécurité du travail. Les paramèters du modèle sont estimés à l’aide d’un
modèle probit potytomique à trois alternatives avec effets individuels aléatoires.
Les résultats confirment les prédictions du modèle théorique. En particulier,
l’élasticité de la probabilité d’accidents par rapport au taux de remplacement de
l’AA varie entre 0,83 et 1,45 dans le cas de lésions difficiles à diagnostiquer, et
entre 0,72 et 1,03 dans le cas de lésions faciles à diagnostiquer (pour la période
entre 1979 et 1986). En outre, la probabiblité de déclarer un accident difficile à
diagnostiquer s’accroît durant la saison d’hiver (i.e. la saison où le taux de
chômage dans le secteur de la construction est le plus élevé).
This paper provides evidence that workers’ compensation (WC) and
unemployment insurance (UI) could affect not only the occurence of workplace
accident claims, but also the composition of these reported accidents. Our
theoretical framework predicts that, under plausible assumptions, an increase
in the wage replacement ration under WC (or a decrease in the UI wage
replacement ratio) leads to a larger increase in the probability of reporting a
difficult-to-diagnose injury than in the probability of reporting an easy-to-
diagnose injury. Panel data on 9800 workers in the Québec construction
industry over each month of the period 1977-1986, combining administrative
data from the Québec Construction Board and the Québec Workers’
Compensation Board, were used for the estimations. The parameters of the
model are estimated using a three alternative MultiNomial Probit (MNP)
framework with individual random effects. Our results confirm our theoretical
predictions. In particular, the impact of the WC replacement ratio on the
probability of accidents ranges (in terms of elasticity) from 0.83 to 1.45 for
difficult-to-diagnose injuries and from 0.72 to 1.03 for easy-to-diagnose injuries
(for the period 1979-1986). In ligne with this result, we also show that the
probability to report a difficult-to-diagnose injury is significantly greater in
winter (the dead season in the construction industry) than in other seasons.
Mots Clés : Lésions professionnelles, assurance-chômage, aléa moral, probit
polytomique
Keywords : Workers’ compensation, unemployment insurance, moral hazard,
multinomial probit
JEL : J28, J65
1 Introduction
The social cost of workplace accidents is large. In a typical year in the
United States, from one-third to one-half as many working days are lost
to work injuries as are lost to unemployment (see Krueger, 1988). Pub-
lic or private provision of insurance against workplace accidents exists
everywhere in industrial countries. Given the fact that the insurer has
imperfect information on the actions of the insured and on the state of
nature, these programs are the source of moral hazard problems. Thus
the provision of insurance may aect the incentives of the insured to
make prevention eorts or may induce him to report a more severe acci-
dent than it is the case. A number of papers provide empirical analyses
of the incentive eects of workers'compensation (WC) insurance. In par-
ticular, they show that an increase in the wage replacement ratio under
WC is associated with an increase in the frequency of reported accidents
(e.g., Krueger, 1990), or in the duration of WC claims (e.g., Fortin and
Lanoie, 1992 and Meyer, Viscusi and Durbin, 1995). Furthermore, re-
cent studies provide empirical evidence that WC insurance may be used
as a substitute for unemployment insurance (UI). Thus workers who are
about to be laid-o may have incentives to reduce their prevention ef-
forts or to attempt to prolong their period of absence from work due to
an accident, insofar as the generosity of WC is greater than that of UI
(see Fortin and Lanoie, 1992 and Fortin et al. 1994).
In this paper, we extend this literature by showing that WC insurance
also aects the composition of reported occupational injuries. Indeed,
increases in the WC wage replacement ratio may lead to another form of
moral hazard: the reporting of injuries that did not occur or occurred o-
the-job, but that are dicult to diagnose (e.g., low-back injuries). The
rst study that explicitly analysed the incentive to shirk is Staten and
Umbeck (1982). More recently, Smith (1989) provided evidence that WC
claims related to back disorders are more likely to arise on Mondays than
on other weekdays, raising the concern that WC is paying the costs of
some o-the-job illnesses and injuries. He argued that this could be due
to the fact that, for many workers, WC compensation is more generous
than o-the-job medical insurance.
1
1
This paper raised some controversies though. Thus Card and McCall (1994),
combining administrative data on workplace injury claims with CPS data on medical
insurance coverage, are not able to show that workers with lower medical coverage
rates are more likely to report a Monday injury than other workers. They conjecture
that the \Monday eect" may be a consequence of the return to work after a \weekend
hiatus" (p.20).
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Our paper innovates in several respects. First, our theoretical frame-
work extends the present literature, which simply considers that a worker
can either have an accident or not (e.g., Krueger, 1990), to the case where
he can also report a false, dicult-to-diagnose, injury. As a result, three
alternatives are possible for the worker: 1) he has a dicult-to-diagnose
accident (true or false), 2) he has an accident with easy diagnosis, or
3) he has no accident. Based on an expected utility framework, our
model predicts that, under reasonable assumptions, an increase in the
wage replacement ratio under WC (or a decrease in the UI wage replace-
ment ratio) leads to a larger increase in the probability of reporting a
dicult-to-diagnose injury than in the probability of reporting an easy-
to-diagnose injury.
Second, panel data on 9800 workers in the Quebec construction in-
dustry over each month of the period 1977-1986, combining adminis-
trative data from the Commission de la construction du Quebec with
data from the Commission de la sante et securite du travail (the Quebec
Workers' Compensation Board), are used in the estimations. Previous
authors who have studied workplace accidents frequency with individual
data have used cross-section data (Krueger, 1990, Moore and Viscusi,
1990). Advantages of panel data over cross-section data are well-known
(for a thorough discussion, see Baltagi, 1995). In particular, panel data
allow to control for individual heterogeneity. In a study of workplace
accidents frequency, there may be many variables that are individual-
invariant (e.g., unobserved dexterity) or time-invariant (e.g., technolog-
ical changes) that may aect accidents. Omission of these variables
may lead to biases in the resulting estimates. Estimating methods using
panel data can control for these individual- and time-invariant variables
whereas methods based on time-series or on cross-section data cannot.
Furthermore, for our purposes, the construction industry is particularly
interesting given that it is one of the most dangerous sectors in terms
of workplace accidents (CSST, 1982) and given that, because of climate
constraints, many workers expect to be unemployed during winter time.
Since WC benets are much more generous than UI benets in Quebec,
this may lead workers to attempt to use WC as a disguised unemploy-
ment insurance.
Our empirical approach is an extension to panel data of the approach
developed in Bolduc et al. (1996) and Bolduc and Ben-Akiva (1991). The
parameters of the model are estimated using a three alternative MultiNo-
mial Probit (MNP) framework with random eects. This model, refered
to as a panel hybrid MNP, has an error component structure which in-
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cludes individual-invariant random terms, a time- and individual-varying
term and a i.i.d. Gumbel term. Many discrete choice models used in the
literature can be seen as a special case of our econometric framework.
In particular, the presence of the i.i.d. Gumbel component allows the
standard MultiNomial Logit (MNL) model and the panel Multinomial
Logit model to be nested within our approach. A panel hybrid Inde-
pendent MultiNomial Probit (IMNP) formulation, consistent with the
absence of correlated errors across alternatives, is also a special case of
our approach.
This paper is likely to contribute to demonstrate the feasibility of
the MNP framework with panel data and random eects. This formu-
lation is particularly appropriate since ignoring the random eects and
performing a standard probit analysis can lead to inconsistent estimates
and misleading inference (see Guilkey and Murphy, 1993).
2
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the
theoretical model, while the data and the econometric framework are
discussed in Section 3. Section 4 presents the empirical results which
conrm our main prediction, i.e., that an increase in the generosity of
WC (and a reduction in the generosity of UI) leads to a larger increase in
the probability of reporting a dicult-to-diagnose injury than an easy-
to-diagnose one. Section 5 provides concluding remarks.
2 The model
The model presented in this section extends the one discussed in Fortin
and Lanoie (1992) in two directions. First, it introduces two types of
injuries (easy- and dicult-to-diagnose injuries). Second, it allows the
worker to report a false, dicult-to-diagnose, injury. Following most
of the litterature, the theoretical model considers only the worker's be-
haviour and ignores that of the employer.
3
However, the empirical model
does take into account the eect of some policy changes (e.g. the intro-
duction of experience rating) on the incentives of employers to inuence
2
For another application of a MNP with panel data and random eects, see Elrod
and Keane (1995) who estimate detergent choice models where each household is
facing eight choices over thirty periods.
3
The model focuses on moral hazard and assumes no adverse selection. The latter
assumption is justied by the fact that the proportion of workers who are insured by
the WC program is close to 100% (only domestic servants and workers in the sport
industry are excluded from the program).
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the level of reported accidents (e.g. by investing in accident-preventing
eort).
4
Let us consider a worker who contemplates the possibility of reporting
(with a certain cost) a false accident in order to claim WC benets. If he
decides to work instead, he must then choose the level of eort to make
in order to prevent the occurrence of a workplace accident. This worker
has thus a two-step optimization problem to solve. In the rst step, he
decides to report or not a false, dicult-to-diagnose, accident. In the
second step, conditional upon choosing not to report a false accident,
he chooses the optimal level of prevention eort in order to reduce the
probability of (true) injuries. Under the assumption that the physician
who determines the duration of the recovery period is a neutral agent
of the worker
5
, the duration of the recovery period compensated by WC
is also a choice variable, at least for a dicult-to-diagnose injury (false
or true). Following the procedure used in dynamic games, we rst solve
the second-step problem. The rst-step one is then backwardly solved
using the solution obtained for the second-step problem.
The horizon decision of the worker is dened on a period of T days
and the accident, if it occurs, takes place at the beginning of the period.
The worker is assumed to have accumulated rights to UI benets and
can thus claim UI benets when he is not working and not drawing WC
benets.
6
In order to reect the situation prevailing in Quebec, it is
assumed that the net UI benet per unit of time, r, is less than the net
WC benet, a, i.e., r < a. Conditional upon his decision not to report
a false accident, the risk-averse worker's expected utility is given by:
EU = p
d
(k) u
d
(x
d
; l
d
)+p
e
(k) u
e
(x
e
; l
e
)+(1 p
d
(k) p
e
(k)) u
n
(x
n
; l
n
) k:
(1)
In (1), indexes d, e and n correspond to the state of the nature where
there is a dicult-to-diagnose accident, an easy-to-diagnose accident and
no accident, respectively. The ex-post utility function u
i
(), for i =
d; e; n, is a concave function of the net income x
i
and leisure l
i
. The
variable k denotes the level of accident-preventing eort by the worker.
The probability of the occurrence of an accident easy- or dicult-to-
4
For a model that takes into account both workers' and employers' behaviour, see
Lanoie (1991). Note that the large majority of studies on the impact of experience
rating conclude that its eect is small or not signicant on the level of reported
accidents (e.g. see Ruser 1985 and Kniesner and Leeth 1988).
5
In Quebec, contrary to most regions, the injured worker has the choice of the
doctor.
6
For simplicity, it is assumed that refusing or quitting jobs is not penalized in
terms of UI benets.
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diagnose is a decreasing convex function of k, that is, p
i
= p
i
(k), with
p
i
k
< 0 and p
i
kk
> 0, for i = e; d.
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While the worker has no control on d
e
, the period of absence com-
pensated by WC when the injury is easy to diagnose, he has some degree
of freedom (through the choice of his doctor, for example) in setting the
duration of this period, in the case of a dicult-to-diagnose injury. How-
ever, this implies a cost for the worker that is increasing at an increasing
rate with the period of absence, d
d
, approved in the medical report above
a lower bound, d: c = c(d
d
  d), with c(0) = 0, c
0
> 0 and c
00
> 0.
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In order to solve the second-step problem, one must derive the indi-
rect utility function associated with each of the three states of nature and
then, the optimal accident-preventing eort. First, conditional upon ex-
periencing a dicult-to-diagnose injury, the worker's net income is given
by: x
d
= w(T   l
d
) + ad
d
+ r(l
d
  d
d
)   c(d
d
  d), where w is the
worker's net wage rate, T   l
d
represents the number of working days
and l
d
  d
d
, the period spent on UI. Assuming an interior solution (i.e.,
l
d
> d
d
> d), the rst-order conditions imply that the net compensation
for one additional day of leisure is the same, whether the individual is
compensated by WC or UI benets, that is, a   c
0
(d
d
  d) = r. Solv-
ing for d
d
yields d
d
= d +
~
d(a   r) with
~
d
a r
> 0. It is easy to show
that the indirect utility function is given by v
d
= v
d
(w   r; y
d
), where
y
d
= rT + (a  r) d
d
  c(d
d
  d) is the virtual nonwage income corre-
sponding to this state of nature. Using Roy's Identity and the envelope
theorem, the marginal utility of WC and of UI benets are respectively
given by: v
d
a
= v
d
y
d
d
d
> 0 and v
d
r
= v
d
y
d
(l
d
  d
d
) > 0. These latter
equations indicate that the marginal utility of each type of benets is
given by the product of the marginal utility of income and the period
spent on the corresponding insurance program.
The analysis is similar when the worker has an easy-to-diagnose in-
jury. His net income is given by x
e
= w(T   l
e
) + ad
e
+ r(l
e
  d
e
),
where the period of recovery, d
e
, is now an exogenous variable. The cor-
responding indirect utility function is given by v
e
= v
e
(w   r; y
e
) where
the virtual nonwage income is given by y
e
= rT + (a   r) d
e
. In this
case, the marginal utility of WC and of UI benets are respectively given
7
These probabilities may also depend on the accident-preventing eorts by the
employer, but we ignore this possibility to simplify the presentation.
8
These costs may thus reect the resources required to nd a cooperative doctor.
Our approach abstracts from the risk related to the probability of control and rejection
of the physician's report. This is in line with tax evasion models which suppose that
tax-evasion activities are foolproof but entail real or psychic costs ( Kesselman 1989).
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by: v
e
a
= v
e
y
e
d
e
> 0 and v
e
r
= v
e
y
e
(l
e
  d
e
) > 0. Finally, in the third
case, when the worker has no accident, his indirect utility function is
given by v
n
= v
n
(w   r; y
n
), with y
n
= rT . In that case, the marginal
utility of UI benets is given by: v
n
r
= v
n
y
n
l
n
.
Let us now derive the optimal level of accident-preventing eort, k,
in the second-step problem. Substituting the ex-post indirect utility
functions into the denition of the expected utility function (1), k is
obtained by solving the following problem:
max
k
EU = p
d
(k) v
d
(w   r; y
d
) + p
e
(k) v
e
(w   r; y
e
) +
(1  p
d
(k)  p
e
(k)) v
n
(w   r; y
n
)  k (2)
The rst-order condition to this problem is:
p
d
k
(v
d
  v
n
) + p
e
k
(v
e
  v
n
)  1 = 0; (3)
where it is assumed that the worker prefers to have no (true) accident,
that is, v
i
< v
n
for i = d; e. Equation (3) can be solved to determine
the optimal level of k as a function of the exogenous variables. Since the
probability of each type of accidents is a function of k, the reduced-form
equation for these probabilities depends also on the exogenous variables:
p
d
= p^
d
(a; r; w) and p
e
= p^
e
(a; r; w) (4)
Dierentiating (3) and using the second-order condition, it can be shown
that these functions have the following properties:
p^
i
a
=  p
i
k
(p
d
k
v
d
a
+ p
e
k
v
e
a
)= > 0
p^
i
r
=  p
i
k
(p
d
k
(v
d
r
  v
n
r
) + p
e
k
(v
e
r
  v
n
r
))=
for i = d; e and where  = (v
d
  v
n
) p
d
kk
+ (v
e
  v
n
)p
e
kk
< 0
Therefore, the eect of an increase in WC benets on the probability
of (true) accidents is unambiguously positive, whether the accident is
dicult- or easy-to-diagnose. However, without additional structure, it
is not clear whether this impact is stronger on dicult-to-diagnose acci-
dents. This issue depends on the technology relating accident-preventing
eorts to the probability of each type of accidents (i.e., whether p
d
k
is less
or greater than p
e
k
). Moreover, the eect of an increase in UI benets,
r, is ambiguous and critically depends on the signs of v
d
r
  v
n
r
and of
v
e
r
  v
n
r
. However, if one is ready to assume, as we will in the sequel,
that the marginal utility of r is smaller when there is an accident than
when there is no accident, p^
i
r
will be negative, for i = d; e.
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Let us now turn to the rst-step problem which consists, for the
worker, to choose or not to report a false accident. The solution to this
problem comes from a comparison between the indirect utility associated
with each alternative. The (expected) indirect utility associated with the
choice not to report an accident, V
nf
, is obtained by substituting the
equation for the probability of each type of accident (see (4)) and the
denition of the three nonwage income variables into (2). One thus
obtains:
V
nf
= V
nf
(a; r; w); with (5)
V
nf
a
= p
d
v
d
y
d
d
d
+ p
e
v
e
y
e
d
e
> 0 and
V
nf
r
= p
d
v
d
y
d
(l
d
  d
d
) + p
e
v
e
y
e
(l
e
  d
e
) + (1  p
d
  p
e
)v
n
y
n
l
n
> 0:
Now, conditional upon reporting a false, dicult-to-diagnose, accident,
the worker's net income is given by: x
f
= w(T   l
f
) + a d
f
+ r(l
f
 
d
f
)   c(d
f
). In order to allow for heterogeneity in the degree of im-
morality aversion across workers that is observable by the worker but
unobservable by the econometrician, a random term , with a symmetric
density function f(), is added to the utility function corresponding to
this situation. Therefore, the indirect random utility function is given
by: V
f
= v
n
(w   r; y
f
) + , where y
f
= rT + (a   r) d
f
  c(d
f
) is
the virtual nonwage income and with d
f
=
~
d(a   r). Substituting this
denition into the indirect utility function, the latter can be expressed
as:
V
f
= V
f
(a; r; w) + ; with (6)
V
f
a
= v
n
y
f
d
f
> 0 and V
f
r
= v
n
y
f
(l
f
  d
f
) > 0:
The introduction of a random term in (6) allows us to analyse the im-
pact of a marginal change in WC (or UI) benets on the probability of
reporting a false accident, p
f
. The latter corresponds to the probability
that V
f
() +  > V
nf
(), i.e., that  > V
nf
()   V
f
(). Therefore, it
is given by the equation: p
f
= F (V
f
()   V
nf
()), where F () is the
cumulative function of . Using (5) and (6), the reduced-form equation
for p
f
can be written as:
p
f
= p^
f
(a; r; w); with (7)
p^
f
a
= f() (v
n
y
f
d
f
  [p
d
v
d
y
d
d
d
+ p
e
v
e
y
e
d
e
]) and (8)
p^
f
r
= f() (v
n
y
f
(l
f
  d
f
)  [p
d
v
d
y
d
(l
d
  d
d
) +
p
e
v
e
y
e
(l
e
  d
e
) + (1  p
d
  p
e
)v
n
y
n
l
n
]) (9)
.
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From (8), one cannot theoretically sign the impact of an increase of
WC benets on the probability of reporting a false injury. However, a
glance on the right-hand side of this equation shows that it is very likely
to be positive and will be assumed so, in the sequel. The basic reason is
that the expression within brackets in (8), which represents the impact
of an increase in a on the expected utility level when there is no false
accident, is likely to be smaller than v
n
y
f
d
f
, which represents its impact
on the utility level when the worker reports a false accident. First, in
the latter case, an increase in WC benets directly aects the worker's
utility level while, in the former case, its eect on his expected utility
level depends on the probabilities of experiencing a true accident, which
are likely to be small. Second, the marginal utility of income is likely
to be smaller when there is a true accident. In fact, if one assumes that
the marginal utility of income and the duration of injuries are the same
in each case and are respectively given by v
y
and d, one has from (8):
p
f
a
= f() v
y
d (1  p
d
  p
e
) > 0.
Similarly, while the impact of an increase in UI benets on the prob-
ability of reporting a false accident is theoretically ambiguous (see (9)),
it is likely to be negative and will again be assumed so, in the sequel.
Here, the basic reason is that, in the absence of a true accident, the
duration of the period on UI is likely to be longer when the worker
does not report a false accident than when he does, i.e., l
n
is likely
to be greater than l
f
  d
f
. Again, under the assumption that the
marginal utility of income, the level of leisure and the duration of ac-
cidents (true or false) are the same in each situation, one obtains from
(9): p
f
r
=  f() v
y
d (1  p
d
  p
e
) < 0.
What are the implications of our analysis on the impact of an increase
of WC (or of UI) benets on the probability of a dicult-to-diagnose
injury as compared with an easy-to-diagnose injury? To answer this
question, let us rst derive the equation for the probability of a (true or
false) dicult-to-diagnose injury p
D
. Using (4) and (7), it is given by:
p
D
= p^
f
(a; r; w) + (1  p^
f
(a; r; w)) p^
d
(a; r; w); (10)
with p^
D
i
= p^
f
i
+ p^
d
i
  p^
d
i
p
f
  p^
f
i
p
d
; for i = a; r: (11)
Equation (10) uses the fact that p
D
is the sum of the probability of a
false injury and of the unconditional probability of a true, dicult-to-
diagnose, injury. In comparison, the probability of an easy-to diagnose
injury, p
E
, is given by:
p
E
= (1  p^
f
(a; r; w)) p^
e
(a; r; w); (12)
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with p^
E
i
= p^
e
i
  p^
e
i
p
f
  p^
f
i
p^
e
; for i = a; r: (13)
Now, let us make the two following plausible assumptions. First, the
eects of WC (respectively, UI) benets on the probability of true easy-
and dicult-to-diagnose accidents are not much dierent, i.e., p^
d
i
 p^
e
i
for i = a; r. Second, the two last expressions in (11) and in (13) are
small (since they involve the probability of each type of accident). Un-
der these assumptions, one obtains, from (11) and (13): p^
D
i
= p^
E
i
+ p^
f
i
.
Therefore the eect of WC (respectively, UI) benets on the probabil-
ity of injuries is positive (respectively, negative) and larger (in absolute
value) for a dicult-to-diagnose than for an easy-to-diagnose injury. The
reason is that, while the probabilities of true easy- and dicult-to diag-
nose accidents are equally aected by a change in benets, there is an
additionnal source of variation in the case of dicult-to-diagnose acci-
dents: the change in the incentives to report a false accident. In the next
section, we will attempt to test empirically these theoretical results.
3 Empirical methods and data
This section develops a stochastic multinomial discrete choice model to
estimate the parameters of the probability for each worker of the sam-
ple considered to experience each of the three following alternatives per
month: a dicult-to-diagnose accident, an easy-to-diagnose accident and
no workplace accident. It also discusses the data and the variables used
in estimations.
3.1 Econometric framework
Since we have no information allowing to distinguish between true and
false accidents, we cannot directly estimate the rst-step random utility
model discussed in the preceding section, in which the individual chooses
to report or not a false accident. In our model, the realisation of any-
one of the three above alternatives partly depends on the choice of the
worker, through his decision to report or not a false accident and his
choice of the level of accident-preventing eorts. But it also depends on
stochastic events that are not under the worker's control and that may
inuence the state of the nature. Therefore, the random utility model,
according to which the realisation of a particular alternative stems en-
tirely from an individual's utility-maximizing decision, but which allows
9
for unobservable preferences heterogeneity, does not directly apply here.
However, we will adopt a similar approach by interpreting the latent
variable associated with each alternative not as an utility indicator, like
in the random utility model, but as a \propensity index" of the alterna-
tive. Accordingly, the random term associated with each alternative will
take into account not only the presence of heterogeneity in preferences
but also stochastic shocks that aect the probability of realisation of the
alternative. The model assumes that the realisation of an alternative
corresponds to the one with the highest propensity index.
Our econometric framework is an extension to panel data of the ap-
proach developed in Bolduc et al. (1996) and Bolduc and Ben-Akiva
(1991). For simplicity, it is assumed that the propensity index functions
are linear in parameters. For a given worker, n = 1; :::; N , the model is
y
int
=
8
<
:
1 if u
int
 u
knt
for k = 1; 2; 3
0 otherwise, and
(14)
u
int
= x
int
 + 
int
;
where
i = 1; 2; 3
t = 1; :::; T
n
n = 1; :::; N
In (14), y
int
denotes the observed realisation associated with alterna-
tive i for individual n at time t; u
int
denotes the corresponding propensity
index; x
int
is the (1K) vector of independent variables;  is a (K 1)
vector of coecients to be estimated, while 
int
is the random distur-
bance the properties of which are to be described in details below. The
main purpose of our econometric analysis is to estimate the parameters
, given information on the observed accidents, on the vector x
int
of
attributes and given the assumptions pertaining to the distribution of
the random disturbance. Note that for certain crucial variables, we will
allow the estimated parameter reecting their impact on the probabil-
ity of experimenting an accident with easy diagnosis to dier from the
parameter reecting their impact on the probability of experimenting a
dicult-to-diagnose injury.
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More specically, our distributional assumptions imply that we write
the model as follows:
u
1nt
= x
1nt
 + p
11
w
1n
+
1

1nt
+
1nt
u
2nt
= x
2nt
 + p
21
w
1n
+ p
22
w
2n
+
2

2nt
+
2nt
u
3nt
= x
3nt
 +
3nt
;
(15)
where w
in
and w
2n
are independent standard normal distributed terms.
To get an uniform notation, we pose that: p
12
= p
31
= p
32
= 
3
= 0,
which makes it possible to write
u
int
= x
int
 + p
i
w
n
+ 
i

int
+ 
int
; (16)
where, by denition, p
i
denotes row i of matrix P of dimension (3  2)
and where w
n
is a (2 1) vector with components w
1n
and w
2n
.
In (16), p
i
w
n
can be interpreted as a Cholesky representation of bi-
variate normal terms with zero means. Since p
i
w
n
is invariant through
time, it permits to capture individual specic eects. The term 
i
de-
notes a standard deviation specic to the i
th
alternative. The 
int
can
potentially capture the correlation between the three propensity indexes
at a given time period and for a given individual. We tested the presence
of such a correlation eect based on a rst-order spatial autoregressive
(SAR(1)) process (see Bolduc et al. 1996) and we rejected it in all speci-
cations. Therefore, we assume that the 
int
's are i.i.d. standard normal
variates.
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Finally, the 
int
terms, as already indicated, are i.i.d. Gumbell
distributed. Given our assumptions, we therefore capture heteroskedas-
tic eects through the 
i
's, and time invariant interdependencies between
the rst two propensity indexes with the help of the p
ij
Cholesky terms.
Note that the restrictions made on the parameters associated with the
third index are made for identication purpose. Also this permits to
include the standard MNL formulation as a nested sub-model, that is
obtained when 
1
= 
2
= p
11
= p
21
= p
22
= 0, and a panel MNL,
when 
1
= 
2
= 0 but with random eects (the p
i
's dierent from zero).
Moreover, it nests a hybrid Independent Multinomial Probit (IMNP)
specication when the 
0
i
s 6= 0 and p
11
= p
21
= p
22
= 0.
9
With a SAR(1) process, one has: 
int
= 
P
3
k 6=i
m
ik

knt
+ 
int
, where  is
the correlation coecient ( 1 <  < 1), where the m
ik
's are boolean contiguity
parameters that are set to one for i = 1; 2 and k = 1; 2, i 6= k, and set to zero
otherwise, and where the 
int
are i.i.d. standard normal variates. The correlation
coecient was not signicant in any specication.
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In principle, the model could be estimated using the maximum like-
lihood approach. However, the dimensionality of the response probabil-
ities would require the calculation of multifold integrals of large dimen-
sion. Current practice now consists in using either a method of simu-
lated moments (MSM) or a method of maximum simulated likelihood
MSL to estimate the unknown parameters of the model. The MSM,
suggested in McFadden (1989) and Pakes and Pollard (1989), replaces
the multifold normal integrals in a conventional generalized method of
moments methodology with smooth (asymptotically) unbiased ecient
simulators calculated from an underlying latent variable model
10
. The
MSL corresponds to a standard maximum likelihood approach where
choice probabilities are replaced with smooth probability simulators
11
.
Lee (1992) has derived the asymptotic distribution of both the MSM and
the MSL estimators based on smooth probability simulators calculated
from a number of draws assumed to increase with the sample size. One
of his results indicates that when a smooth probability simulator satises
the adding-up property, the MSL estimator is asymptotically equivalent
to an MSM estimator with known instruments. As he also noted, the
simulated likelihood approach may have computational advantages over
the MSM method. Therefore, the MSL method is the one that has been
used in this paper.
Our assumptions also entail computational simplications as a nat-
ural smooth simulator for the choice probabilities arises. It is expressed
as an empirical mean of conditional MNL choice probabilities. It also
automatically satises the adding-up property. A similar approach was
also exploited in Berkovec and Stern (1991).
12
Given the assumptions made, conditional on w
n
and on draws 
1nt
,

2nt
, 
3nt
of 
nt
made at a given time period t, a probability of realisation
for alternative i can be computed as:
P
n
(i j x
int
; w
n
; 
nt
) =
e
x
int
+p
i
w
n
+
i

int
P
3
j=1
e
x
jnt
+p
j
w
n
+
j

jnt
(17)
10
For a recent study which used the MSM approach, see Hajivassiliou and McFad-
den (1990).
11
See Borsh-Supan and Hajivassiliou (1990), Bolduc and Ben-Akiva (1991) and
Bolduc et al. (1996) for empirical studies using this approach.
12
We also attempted to estimate a panel multinomial probit model (with no logit
kernel) using the so-called Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (e.g., see Geweke et al. 1992)
choice probability simulator. However, it proved very dicult to estimate in practice
and provided estimates very similar to those obtained with our approach. Therefore,
in the sequel, the empirical discussion will focus on our hybrid multinomial probit
framework.
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We denote it as:
P
n
(i j x
int
; w
n
; 
nt
)  
n
(i j w
n
; 
nt
):
Moreover, the conditional probability of realisation describing the
joint observed situations faced by an individual n, 8t = 1; :::; T
n
, that
are incorporated in a y
n
vector, is given by:
P
n
(y
n
j w
n
; 
n
) =
T
n
Y
t=1

n
(i
nt
j w; 
t
)
The unconditional probability of realisation can thus be written as:
P
n
(y
n
) =
Z

Z
w
T
n
Y
t=1

n
(i
nt
j w; )N(; I
3
)N(w; I
2
)d dw; (18)
where N(z; I
j
) is the multivariate standard normal density function of a
vector z with a covariance matrix given by I
j
.
Equation(18) is naturally approximated by:
f
n
(y
n
) =
1
R
R
X
r=1
T
n
Y
t=1

n
(i
nt
j w
nr
; 
ntr
): (19)
where R is the number of draws on (w
n
; 
nt
) from standard normal den-
sity distributions. The log-likelihood is therefore:
L

=
N
X
n=1
ln(P
n
(y
n
))
and the simulated log-likehood to be maximized is denoted as
L =
N
X
n=1
ln(f
n
(y
n
)); (20)
where f
n
(y
n
) is calculated using (19).
3.2 Data and variables
The original data source for this study follows the evolution of 30,341
workers in the construction industry who worked at least one hour at
13
the James Bay hydro-electric project (a major dam construction plan
in northern Quebec) during the period 1976-86. We are able to track
the work pattern each month (number of hours worked, occurrence of
an accident, etc.) of the workers throughout this period as long as they
were working in the construction industry. For tractability, we selected
a sample of 9800 of these workers for our estimations.
This sample contained 1269monthly observations involving a dicult-
to-diagnose injury with time lost
13
, and 1626 observations involving an
easy-to-diagnose injury. Our initial estimations did not converge pre-
sumably because of the very low proportion of monthly observations
with occurrence of either a dicult-to-diagnose or an easy-to-diagnose
injury (less than one percent). Such a problem is frequent with this kind
of data, and often leads the researcher to oversample the rare alternative
so as to increase the accuracy of his analysis. This was done here up to
the point where the proportion of observations with no accident repre-
sented 87 %. As shown by Imbens (1992), this choice-based sampling
method is not likely to create severe biases in the estimated coecients
except for the intercepts. The latter were corrected using the standard
method adopted in the case of MNL estimators (see Imbens 1992). De-
scriptive statistics for the sample are given in Table 1 at the end of the
text.
We distinguish between dicult-to-diagnose injuries and accidents
with an easy diagnosis, based on a classication initially used by Dionne
and St-Michel (1991). As discussed in Dionne and St-Michel, this cate-
gorization was established in consultation with a physician specialized in
work-related health problems. The main types of occupational injuries
that belong to each group are the following: (1) Easy-to-diagnose in-
juries: contusion, poisoning, fracture, amputation without permanent
partial disability and friction burn; (2) Dicult-to-diagnose injuries:
back-related injuries, bursitis and spinal disorders.
Because of important policy changes occurring in 1979, we thought
it was reasonable to make our estimations for two dierent subsamples:
1) a sample covering the years 1977-1978 inclusively, and a sample for
the remaining observations. These important policy changes are: 1) the
introduction of experience rating on a rm-by-rm basis (CSST, 1982)
14
,
13
An accident with time lost is an accident involving more than one day o work.
The permanent disability cases are excluded from the sample.
14
In Quebec, as in the rest of North America, rms are considered liable for work-
place accidents and pay WC insurance premia. Experience rating refers to the ad-
justment of WC insurance premia to reect past claim experience.
14
and 2) the passage from a wage replacement indemnity equal to 75% of
gross income (non-taxable) to an indemnity of 90% of the net income
(again non-taxable). In particular, the introduction of experience rating
may have induced rms, following an increase in WC replacement ratio,
to devote more resources to workplace safety because they have to bear
more fully the cost of greater incidences of injuries.
We now turn to the explanatory variables (the vector x) used in the
estimations. Our theoretical model suggests the use of the three fol-
lowing variables: the WC and the UI wage replacement ratios and the
wage rate. The WC replacement ratio is dened as the level of benets
divided by the net marginal wage. It has been calculated individually
using information on the WC parameters and on the provincial and fed-
eral income tax systems in place in each year (see the details in Fortin
et al., 1994). In the literature, only Moore and Viscusi (1990) have a
replacement ratio calculated individually, using cross-section data. The
mean WC replacement ratio in our sample (see Table 1) is 113 percent.
One reason why it is greater than 100 percent is that, under the Que-
bec WC regulations, benets calculation is based on the earnings of the
twelve months preceding the accident. In this calculation, the worker
is imputed the same average weekly income for his period o construc-
tion as the one he earns during the construction season, which tends to
increase the numerator of the ratio. Second, since WC benets are not
taxable and are based either on gross wages (before 1979) or on net aver-
age wages (after 1979), the (marginal) replacement ratio may be higher
than 100 percent for workers with a marginal tax rate higher than a
critical level. The UI replacement ratio is also calculated individually
and is 0.55, at the mean of our sample.
The WAGE is measured by the worker's net marginal wage rate (in
1981 dollars). There is an important literature showing that the wage
and the occupational safety level are the result of a simultaneous deci-
sion process (e.g., Garen, 1988), making the wage rate (and the replace-
ment ratios) an endogenous variable
15
. Moreover, individual unobserv-
able characteristics that aect the wage rate (e.g., motivation to work)
may also inuence the probability of an accident. For these reasons,
the wage variable and the two replacement ratios (all in log) have been
replaced by generated regressors in the likelihood function, following a
two-step approach suggested by Durbin (1970) and Pagan (1984)
16
.
15
For instance, according to the theory of compensating wage dierentials, more
dangerous jobs lead to a higher wage rate, see Thaler and Rosen (1976).
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The variables used in the rst-step regression to generate predicted wage rates
and the replacement ratios are all the exogenous covariates used in the second step
15
In keeping with our theoretical discussion, we also consider seasonal
dummy variables to capture the fact that workers may have more incen-
tive to report a dicult-to-diagnose injury just before the usual lay-o
season in the construction industry. Therefore, we expect the coe-
cient of the dummy variable for QUARTER 1 (November, December
and January) to be a positive and signicant determinant of dicult-
to-diagnose injuries. We also introduced a variable of unemployment in
order to take into account the eect of labour market rationing on the
incidence of workplace accidents. The variable UNEMP is dened as the
regional unemployment rate as determined by Statistics Canada.
Furthermore, two personal characteristics are taken into account.
First, the AGE of the worker is introduced, since it is generally ac-
cepted (e.g., see Krueger, 1990) that, ceteris paribus, older workers are
more risk averse, which may reduce their probability of experiencing an
accident. Second, a variable capturing the level of qualication (QUALI)
of the worker is included. It is dened as the number of working years
required to qualify as a registered member of a given occupation within
the construction industry (e.g., carpenter). This variable is intended to
capture the worker's skill level. As in Moore and Viscusi (1990), it is
expected that more skilled workers are better able to avoid accidents.
17
In addition, we consider REGIONAL dummies to capture the fact
that the nature of the construction projects may vary from one region
to another (especially at James Bay), leading to dierent likelihood of
experiencing an accident. After some experimentation, dummies for the
regions of Montreal, Quebec, North Shore, James Bay and Abitibi have
been used in estimations (other regions are default). Finally, we intro-
duce year dummies to capture omitted xed eects that vary across time,
but not across individuals. These dummies may be useful to account
for institutional changes in unemployment insurance and occupational
safety policies (like changes in safety-enhancing measures) during the
period that may not be captured with our WC and UI variables.
and age
2
, age
3
, qualication
2
, qualication
3
, plus interaction terms between age and
qualication (up to the second degree). These additional variables (which are all
statistically signicant) introduce over-identifying restrictions to the model. Note
however that the standard errors of the corresponding estimated coecients are
generally inconsistent. While bootstrapping methods could theoretically be used
to generate consistent standard errors estimates, such an approach would be highly
time-consuming. One way to circumvent this problem is to interpret our analysis as
conditional upon the value of the generated regressors.
17
In some specications, we also introduced the variables age
2
and qualication
2
in order to test some over-identifying restrictions of the model. These restrictions
were not rejected for any specication at the 5% level.
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4 Empirical results
Our estimation results are presented in Table 2 (for 1977-1978) and Table
3 (for 1979-1986). Each Table includes four columns. The last column is
the panel hybrid IMNP specication, while the three preceding columns
are special cases of this general formulation. In column (3), we present
a panel MNL specication by setting the 
i
's equal to zero; column (2)
displays the standard MNL results (by setting both the 
i
's and the p
i
's
equal to zero), and column (1) presents a standard logit model where
the two categories of injuries are added together.
First, we performed likelihood ratio tests showing that it was rele-
vant to divide our sample into two sub-periods. Thus the 
2
statistic
corresponding to the panel IMNP specication (column (4)) is 105.23.
Further, in both tables, we reject the joint hypothesis that the 
i
's and
the p
i
's are equal to zero. The 
2
statistics are 22.96 for the period 77-
78 and 80.18 for the remaining years. The standard MNL specication
(column (2)) is thus rejected by our data. However, we could not reject
that the 
i
's are jointly equal to zero in both tables, with a 
2
statistic
of 0.04 for the period 77-78 and of 2.98 for the remaining years. There-
fore we reject the panel hybrid IMNP specication (column (4)). As a
consequence of these various tests, one is led to conclude that the panel
MNL model (column (3) of each Table) is not rejected by the data.
In general, the sign, the magnitude and the precision of the esti-
mated coecients are robust across models. Concerning our main vari-
ables of interest, the WC replacement ratio (in log) has everywhere a
positive and signicant impact on the probability of reporting a dicult-
to-diagnose injury, while the impact on the probability of reporting an
easy-to-diagnose injury is positive and not signicant before 1979, but
signicant for the period 79-86 (in the simple logit (column (1)), the im-
pact on all types of injuries is positive and signicant in each period). In
addition, as expected, the impact is always stronger on the probability
of reporting a dicult-to-diagnose injury than one with easy diagnosis.
The elasticities related to the dicult-to-diagnose injuries range (see Ta-
ble 4), across the three last columns, from 2.41 to 3.12 before 1979 (0.84
to 1.45 for the period 79-86), while they range from 1.02 to 1.65 before
1979 (0.72 to 1.01 for the period 79-86) for the easy-to-diagnose injuries.
Furthermore, the larger elasticities before 1979 are compatible with the
introduction of experience rating in 1979, which induces rms to devote
more resources to workplace safety, or the monitoring of injuries.
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As expected, the UI replacement ratio (in log) has everywhere (in-
cluding the simple logit) a negative and signicant impact on the prob-
ability of reporting an injury (expect for the period 79-86 where its
impact on easy- to-diagnose injuries is unexpectedly positive but not
signicant). Interestingly, this is the rst result showing that the gen-
erosity of UI has an eect on the probability of a workplace accident. The
only other paper that has examined this relation is Fortin and Lanoie
(1992), who found no such impact presumably because they were using
data at the industry level, while we are using data from the construction
industry, a sector in which substitution between UI and WC is more
likely
18
. Furthermore, the impact is always stronger (in absolute value)
on the probability of reporting a dicult-to-diagnose injury than one
with easy diagnosis. The elasticities related to the dicult-to-diagnose
injuries range across the three last columns from -1.93 to -2.32 before
1979 (-1.24 to -1.81 for the period 79-86), while they range from -1.20
to -1.47 before 1979 (0.22 to 0.55 for the period 79-86) for the easy-to-
diagnose injuries. These results conrm that decreases in the generosity
of the UI regime lead to higher injury rates reecting mainly increases
in the reporting of dicult-to-diagnose injuries. In fact, when we test
jointly whether the impact of the replacement ratios (WC and UI) on
each type of injury is the same, we strongly reject the null hypothesis
for the period 79-86 (with a 
2
statistic of 19.72). The fact that the
elasticities are smaller for the period 79-86 is again compatible with the
introduction of experience rating.
It is also noteworthy that, in general, the impact of WC on the
probability of reporting an injury is larger than the absolute value of
the UI impact (except for dicult-to-diagnose injuries for the period 79-
86). This seems reasonable given that the eect of an insurance regime
on the phenomenon it insures is likely to be stronger than the indirect
impact of another insurance regime.
The impact of the WC ratio on the probability of reporting an in-
jury for each sub-period is relatively strong compared to the rest of the
literature. Typical WC frequency elasticities vary between 0.2 and 0.8
(e.g., Krueger, 1990). Three reasons could be advanced to explain such
a result. First, the construction industry presents certain characteris-
tics (regular lay-os) that make substitution between the two insurance
regimes much more likely than in other sectors of economic activity.
Moreover, it is likely that the intertemporal labor supply elasticity is
18
Although they found that increases in the generosity of UI has a negative impact
on the duration of WC claims.
18
higher in the case of individuals who choose to work in a seasonal in-
dustry. Second, as mentioned earlier, in Quebec, in contrast with other
jurisdictions, the role of the worker's doctor is crucial in determining the
duration on WC. Therefore, moral hazard is likely to be more impor-
tant than elsewhere. Third, the American studies do not account for the
possible interaction between the two insurance regimes, which may bias
their results
19
.
In addition, in line with the preceding results, the probability of re-
porting a dicult-to-diagnose injury is greater in Quarter 1 (November,
December, January) than in the default quarter (Quarter 3: May, June
and July - the peak of the year in terms of activity) and this result is
signicant for the period 77-78. As mentioned earlier, Quarter 1 is typ-
ically a \dead season" in the construction industry, and workers may
thus be tempted to report a dicult-to-diagnose injury to benet from
WC instead of UI.
20
In Quarter 4 (the end of the high season: August,
September, October), the probability of reporting an injury with an easy
diagnosis is signicantly greater than in Quarter 3, perhaps reecting the
impact of the fatigue following the peak of the season (before 1979, the
probability of reporting a dicult-to-diagnose injury is also signicantly
higher in Quarter 4). Finally, before 1979, the probability of reporting
an injury with an easy diagnosis is signicantly lower in Quarter 2 (the
beginning of the high season) than in Quarter 3.
Concerning the other variables, the impact of the WAGE (in log) on
both types of injuries is always positive and signicant. Furthermore,
this impact is always stronger on the probability of having a dicult-
to-diagnose injury than on the probability of having an injury with an
easy diagnosis. While a positive sign may partly be explained by the
implied increase in the level of WC benets (since the WC ratio is as-
sumed constant), this may also suggest the existence of an income eect
such that high-income individuals can aord to \buy more leisure" and
be more often on WC. This argument may be particularly appealing
given that our analysis focuses on an industry where the average wage
is relatively high
21
, while other studies with converse results (negative
19
Fortin and Lanoie (1992) actually show that the magnitude of the WC impact is
reduced when one does not account for the UI variables. This result is not surprising
since, given that the UI and WC replacement ratios are positively correlated, omitting
the UI ratio will produce a downward bias in the estimates of the eect of the WC
ratio.
20
Another explanation for this result is that the cold winter climate observed in
Quebec is likely to lead to more accidents. However, this leaves unexplained the fact
that the eect of the cold season is signicant only for dicult-to-diagnose injuries.
21
For instance, during the period 1977-1986, the average weekly wage in the Cana-
19
sign) are based on more heterogeneous samples (e.g., Butler and Worrall,
1983).
Moreover, the impact of the AGE on the probability of both types of
injuries is negative and signicant
22
, conrming that older workers may
be more experienced or more risk averse leading to less accidents. In the
same line, the impact of the QUALIFICATION on both types of injuries
is always negative and signicant, reecting that better able workers have
less accidents. The impact of UNEMP is never signicant presumably
because the cyclical variations in economic activity are mainly captured
by the yearly dummies.
Finally, as regards REGIONAL dummies, a number of remarks are
in order. First, before 1979, the probability of experiencing an injury of
either type is signicantly higher at James Bay than in other regions;
this is the only signicant eect observed for this period. For the period
79-86 however, the probability of a dicult-to-diagnose injury is signif-
icantly lower at James Bay than in the default region (rest of Quebec),
while the impact on the probability of reporting an injury with easy
diagnosis is not aected. Conversations with ocials of the AECQ (As-
sociation des entrepreneurs en construction du Quebec) provided us with
plausible reasons for the preceding results: 1) the authorities responsi-
ble for occupational safety and health (OSH) at James Bay increased
their monitoring activities after 1980; 2) the Quebec board responsible
for OSH also increased its inspections after 1980 with a noticeable eect
(a result partly conrmed in Lanoie and Streliski, 1996) and 3) the peak
of the construction activities at James Bay was in the period 1977-1978.
Furthermore, after 1978, the probability of an injury of either type is
signicantly larger in the Montreal and Quebec areas than in the default
region (although the evidence is not conclusive for dicult-to-diagnose
injuries in the Quebec area). Potential explanations are (again from
ocials of the AECQ): Life is more anonymous in urban centers, while
construction projects are smaller (more residential and commercial as op-
posed to more industrial in the regions) leading to more frequent work
interruptions than in the regions, both phenomena may induce workers
to more substitution between WC and UI. Finally, the probability of ex-
periencing a dicult-to-diagnose injury is signicantly higher in Abitibi
than in the default region, while the probability of experiencing an easy-
dian construction industry was $ 632.61 (Cdn $ 1986) versus $ 458.43 in the rest of
the economy.
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Statistical tests showed that the impact of AGE, QUALI and UNEMP on the
probability of one type of injury was not signicantly dierent from their impact on
the other type.
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to-diagnose injury is signicantly higher in the North Shore area than in
the default region, both phenomena could be related to the nature of the
construction projects or the level of economic activity across regions.
5 Conclusion
This paper has provided the rst empirical results indicating that WC in-
surance could aect not only the frequency or the duration of workplace
accident claims, but also the composition of these reported accidents.
Our theoretical framework extended the present literature, which sim-
ply considers that a worker can either have an accident or not, to the
case where he can also report a false dicult-to-diagnose injury. Our
model predicts that, under reasonable assumptions, an increase in the
wage replacement ratio under WC (or a decrease in the UI wage replace-
ment ratio) leads to a larger increase in the probability of reporting a
dicult-to-diagnose injury than in the probability of reporting an easy-
to-diagnose injury.
Panel data on 9800 workers in the Quebec construction industry over
each month of the period 1977-1986 were used for the estimations. Our
empirical approach is an extension to panel data of the method devel-
oped in Bolduc et al. (1996) and Bolduc and Ben-Akiva (1991). The
parameters of the model were estimated using a three alternative panel
hybrid MultiNomial Probit (MNP) framework. Our results conrmed
our theoretical prediction that an increase in the generosity of WC (and
a decrease in the generosity of UI) leads to a larger increase in the prob-
ability of reporting a dicult-to-diagnose injury than in the probability
of reporting an easy-to-diagnose injury. In line with this result, we also
showed that the probability to report a dicult-to-diagnose injury is
signicantly greater in winter (the dead season in the construction in-
dustry) than in other seasons. These empirical evidence are consistent
with the presence of moral hazard and of a substitution between WC
and UI in the construction industry.
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TABLE 1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
a
Stand.
Variable Means Dev. Min Max
Dicult-to-diagnose 0.44 0.50 0 1
Easy-to-diagnose 0.56 0.50 0 1
WC replacement ratio 1.13 0.11 0.28 1.51
UI replacement ratio 0.55 0.09 0.10 0.67
Regional
unemployment rate 12.63 2.86 6.60 21.60
Age 37.38 10.24 17 70
Years of qualication 1.52 1.48 0 5
Region
James Bay 0.29 0.45 0 1
Quebec 0.13 0.34 0 1
Montreal 0.25 0.43 0 1
North Shore 0.04 0.19 0 1
Abitibi 0.06 0.24 0 1
Quarter
November, December, January 0.21 0.41 0 1
February, March, April 0.19 0.39 0 1
May, June, July 0.28 0.45 0 1
August, September, October 0.32 0.47 0 1
Year
1977 0.13 0.34 0 1
1978 0.14 0.35 0 1
1979 0.13 0.33 0 1
1980 0.11 0.31 0 1
1981 0.11 0.31 0 1
1982 0.08 0.26 0 1
1983 0.07 0.25 0 1
1984 0.08 0.27 0 1
1985 0.08 0.27 0 1
1986 0.08 0.27 0 1
a 391 030 observations, 2895 accidents and 9807 workers
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TABLE 2
PROBABILITY OF WORKPLACE ACCIDENTS (1977-1978)
(Standard errors in parantheses)
Variable Logit Multi. Logit Multi. Logit Panel Multi. Probit* Panel
Constant -14.362   (2.125)
Difficult diagnosis -14.48     (2.82  ) -18.29      (3.61  ) -18.39     (3.66  )
Easy diagnosis -12.27     (2.58  ) -15.99      (3.40  ) -16.19     (3.57  )
ln(REPL ) 2.157   (0.648)wc
Difficult diagnosis 2.37     (0.951) 3.21       (1.34 ) 3.22     (1.36  )
Easy diagnosis 0.994   (0.819) 1.79       (1.17 ) 1.78     (1.19  )
ln(REPL ) -1.964   (0.478)ui
Difficult diagnosis -1.92     (0.692) -2.45      (0.912) -2.46     (0.925)
Easy diagnosis -1.13     (0.599) -1.60      (0.870) -1.60     (0.888)
ln(UNEMP) -0.928   (0.597) -0.887   (0.660) -0.770    (0.869) -0.780    (0.872)
ln(AGE) -0.810   (0.195) -0.831   (0.212) -0.969    (0.297) -0.972    (0.303)
QUALI -0.264   (0.054) -0.261   (0.057) -0.286    (0.080) -0.289    (0.082)
ln(WAGE) 5.595   (0.738)
Difficult diagnosis 5.19     (1.01  ) 6.38      (1.37  ) 6.41      (1.38  )
Easy diagnosis 4.63     (0.896) 5.80      (1.36  ) 5.86      (1.43  )
Regions
Montreal -0.023    (0.236)
Difficult diagnosis -0.242    (0.415) -0.159    (0.475) -0.165    (0.480)
Easy diagnosis 0.400    (0.335) 0.514    (0.407) 0.520    (0.413)
Quebec 0.136    (0.250)
Difficult diagnosis 0.399    (0.375) 0.360    (0.434) 0.369    (0.437)
Easy diagnosis 0.099    (0.362) 0.021    (0.411) 0.021    (0.419)
James Bay 0.992    (0.207)
Difficult diagnosis 0.998    (0.322) 1.26      (0.403) 1.26      (0.408)
Easy diagnosis 1.10      (0.282) 1.35      (0.354) 1.37      (0.370)
North Shore -0.285    (0.481)
Difficult diagnosis -0.261    (0.767) -0.090    (0.962) -0.083    (0.967)
Easy diagnosis -0.175    (0.636) 0.071    (0.757) 0.079    (0.768)
Abitibi 0.260    (0.329)
Difficult diagnosis 0.089    (0.531) 0.345    (0.637) 0.344    (0.639)
Easy diagnosis 0.317    (0.435) 0.530    (0.529) 0.535    (0.540)
Quarters
Quarter 1 0.460    (0.155)
Difficult diagnosis 0.554    (0.249) 0.771    (0.310) 0.777    (0.312)
Easy diagnosis 0.180    (0.215) 0.368    (0.267) 0.374    (0.277)
* This corresponds to an hybrid multinomial probit (that is, with a logit kernel).
TABLE 2 (cont’d)
Variable Logit Multi. Logit Multi. Logit Panel Multi. Probit* Panel
Quarter 2 -0.355    (0.194)
Difficult diagnosis -0.353    (0.311) -0.406    (0.371) -0.399    (0.373)
Easy diagnosis -0.630    (0.266) -0.767    (0.349) -0.771    (0.355)
Quarter 4 0.378    (0.138)
Difficult diagnosis 0.413    (0.231) 0.631    (0.277) 0.633    (0.282)
Easy diagnosis 0.276    (0.187) 0.468    (0.235) 0.471    (0.246)
Years
1978 1.039    (0.151) 1.01      (0.165) 1.33      (0.249) 1.34      (0.258)
0.092    (1.24  )1
0.419    (0.977)2
p 1.58      (0.345) 1.59      (0.365)11
p 0.294    (0.489) 0.339    (0.509)21
p -0.818    (0.558) -0.867    (0.540)22
Log-likelihood -2258.54 -1201.38 -1189.92 -1189.90
* This corresponds to an hybrid multinomial probit (that is, with a logit kernel).
TABLE 3
PROBABILITY OF WORKPLACE ACCIDENTS (1979-1986)
(Standard errors in parantheses)
Variable Logit Multi. Logit Multi. Logit Panel Multi. Probit* Panel
Constant -7.040   (0.640)
Difficult diagnosis -8.88     (0.900) -10.08      (1.00  ) -10.15     (1.05  )
Easy diagnosis -6.87     (0.862) -7.71      (0.973) -8.18     (1.12  )
Log(REPL ) 0.780   (0.373)wc
Difficult diagnosis 0.847   (0.544) 1.31       (0.590) 1.44     (0.605)
Easy diagnosis 0.716   (0.527) 1.05       (0.548) 1.09     (0.611)
Log(REPL ) -0.523   (0.243)ui
Difficult diagnosis -1.25     (0.347) -1.70      (0.391) -1.81     (0.405)
Easy diagnosis 0.542   (0.355) 0.202    (0.384) 0.295    (0.432)
Log(UNEMP) -0.153   (0.153) -0.117   (0.185) -0.061    (0.212) -0.080    (0.225)
Log(AGE) -0.725   (0.083) -0.735   (0.101) -0.938    (0.123) -1.01      (0.140)
QUALI -0.144   (0.017) -0.142   (0.021) -0.172    (0.025) -0.185    (0.028)
Log(WAGE) 2.403   (0.219)
Difficult diagnosis 2.76     (0.326) 3.38      (0.363) 3.52      (0.388)
Easy diagnosis 2.27     (0.309) 2.79      (0.348) 3.03      (0.418)
* This corresponds to an hybrid multinomial probit (that is, with a logit kernel).
TABLE 3 (cont’d)
 
Variable Logit Multi. Logit Multi. Logit Panel Multi. Probit* Panel
Regions
Montreal 0.471    (0.063)
Difficult diagnosis 0.325    (0.415) 0.341    (0.110) 0.336    (0.113)
Easy diagnosis 0.635    (0.091) 0.640    (0.102) 0.716    (0.130)
Quebec 0.226    (0.078)
Difficult diagnosis 0.147    (0.117) 0.141    (0.136) 0.143    (0.139)
Easy diagnosis 0.226    (0.113) 0.207    (0.124) 0.225    (0.139)
James Bay -0.043    (0.084)
Difficult diagnosis -0.308    (0.131) -0.328    (0.144) -0.326    (0.145)
Easy diagnosis 0.181    (0.120) 0.172    (0.129) 0.190    (0.145)
North Shore 0.305    (0.110)
Difficult diagnosis -0.280    (0.208) -0.230    (0.228) -0.230    (0.231)
Easy diagnosis 0.574    (0.153) 0.635    (0.169) 0.746    (0.212)
Abitibi 0.290    (0.092)
Difficult diagnosis 0.340    (0.139) 0.390    (0.163) 0.392    (0.165)
Easy diagnosis 0.169    (0.145) 0.204    (0.161) 0.207    (0.180)
Quarters
Quarter 1 0.133    (0.058)
Difficult diagnosis 0.202    (0.094) 0.155    (0.103) 0.163    (0.104)
Easy diagnosis 0.072    (0.089) 0.041    (0.095) 0.036    (0.108)
Quarter 2 0.190    (0.053)
Difficult diagnosis 0.057    (0.101) 0.086    (0.111) 0.088    (0.113)
Easy diagnosis -0.003    (0.094) 0.037    (0.100) 0.043    (0.113)
Quarter 4 0.190    (0.053)
Difficult diagnosis 0.052    (0.087) 0.033    (0.096) 0.032    (0.097)
Easy diagnosis 0.237    (0.078) 0.230    (0.085) 0.263    (0.099)
Years
1979 -0.291    (0.079) -0.316    (0.092) -0.374    (0.103) -0.405    (0.110)
1980 -0.192    (0.079) -0.289    (0.093) -0.124    (0.109) -0.137    (0.115)
1982 0.103    (0.091) 0.067    (0.110) 0.092    (0.126) 0.093    (0.134)
1983 0.074    (0.092) 0.099    (0.112) 0.190    (0.126) 0.205    (0.134)
1984 0.127    (0.086) 0.139    (0.105) 0.151    (0.118) 0.174    (0.125)
1985 0.219    (0.080) 0.248    (0.097) 0.277    (0.109) 0.290    (0.116)
1986 0.351    (0.108) 0.367    (0.096) 0.462    (0.108) 0.475    (0.117)
0.162    (0.470)1
0.989    (0.407)2
p 0.808    (0.077) 0.921    (0.118)11
p -0.091    (0.120) -0.038    (0.157)21
p -0.405    (0.185) 0.467    (0.167)22
Log-likelihood -14284.69 -6818.53 -6779.93 -6778.44
* This corresponds to an hybrid multinomial probit (that is, with a logit kernel).
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TABLE 4
ESTIMATED ELASTICITIES
1977-1978 1979-1986
REPL REPL REPL REPLwc ui wc ui
Logit 1.6016 -1.4016 0.7000 -0.3322
Multi. Logit
Difficult diagnosis 2.4096 -1.9277 0.8374 -1.2426
Easy diagnosis 1.0274 -1.1986 0.7194 0.5501
Multi. Logit Panel
Difficult diagnosis 3.1108 -2.3033 1.2925 -1.6693
Easy diagnosis 1.6539 -1.4668 1.0341 0.2229
Multi. Probit (Kernel) Panel
Difficult diagnosis 3.1229 -2.3164 1.4506 -1.8132
Easy diagnosis 1.6445 -1.4620 1.0149 0.2985
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